Abstract. Vehicular communication (V2X) technologies allow vehicles to exchange information about the road conditions and their own status, and thereby enhance transportation safety and efficiency. For broader deployment, however, such technologies are expected to address security and privacy concerns, preventing abuse by users and by the system's entities. In particular, the system is expected to enable the revocation of malicious vehicles, e.g., in case they send invalid information to their peers or to the roadside infrastructure; it should also prevent the system from being misused for tracking honest vehicles. Both features are enabled by Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI) solutions such as Security Credential Management Systems (SCMS), one of the leading candidates for protecting V2X communication in the United States. Unfortunately, though, SCMS's original revocation mechanism can lead to large Certification Revocation Lists (CRLs), which in turn impacts the bandwidth usage and processing overhead of the system. In this article, we propose a novel design called Activation Codes for Pseudonym Certificates (ACPC), which can be integrated into SCMS to address this issue. Our proposal is based on activation codes, short bitstrings without which certificates previously issued to a vehicle cannot be used by the latter, which are periodically distributed to non-revoked vehicles using an efficient broadcast mechanism. As a result, the identifiers of the corresponding certificates do no need to remain on the CRL for a long time, reducing the CRLs' size and streamlining their distribution and verification of any vehicle's revocation status. Besides describing ACPC in detail, we also compare it to similar-purpose solutions such as Issue First Activate Later (IFAL) and Binary Hash Tree based Certificate Access Management (BCAM). This analysis shows that our proposal not only brings security improvements (e.g., in terms of resilience against colluding system authorities), but also leads to processing and bandwidth overheads that are orders of magnitude smaller than those observed in the state of the art.
Introduction
The longstanding pursuit for Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) [9] has been leading the automotive industry to expand the variety of computing and communication capabilities in vehicles, as well as in the roadside infrastructure. In particular, the increasing support to the so-called V2X communications technologies -including vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) mechanisms -allows the development of many ITS-oriented applications [15, 13] . Usually, such applications involve acquiring information about road conditions (e.g., its slope and current traffic load) and about the vehicles' state (e.g., velocity, acceleration, position and distance to other cars) [27] . Such information can then be shared among vehicles and also relayed to drivers, so adequate actions can then be taken manually or (semi-)automatically. The expected results include a reduction on traffic congestion, transportation delays, pollution emissions and waste of fuel, as well as increase safety for both vehicles and pedestrians [9, 7] .
To become largely deployed and achieve their full potential, ITS technologies need to address some important concerns, in particular those related to security and privacy [30, 10] . Specifically, the authenticity of data exchanged via V2X is critical to prevent malicious users of abusing the system, such as forcing a target vehicle to stop by simulating an accident ahead. This can be accomplished via digital signatures computed over the broadcast messages, as well as with the revocation of a vehicle's certificates whenever misbehavior is detected. By relying on such Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI), vehicles would only trust in, and act upon, authentic messages signed by non-revoked peers. However, to avoid privacy issues, the certificates employed by vehicles should not have the long lifespan typical of certificates traditionally employed on the Internet. Otherwise, the certificates themselves could be employed by eavesdroppers to track the mobility patterns of vehicles periodically broadcasting their positions. Actually, even when the broadcast messages do not contain a vehicle's exact position, tracking is still possible if the eavesdropper can pinpoint the origin of each message and the time in which it was sent.
A potential solution for these issues is the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) [34, 5] , which is currently one of the leading VPKI candidate designs in the United States. Basically, SCMS proposes that each vehicle should carry multiple pseudonym certificates, i.e., certificates carrying no identifier of their owners. Even though each individual pseudonym certificate is short-lived, the batch of certificates carried by each vehicle is expected to cover a long time (e.g., a few years). As a result, messages signed by the same vehicle using different pseudonyms cannot be linked together, so privacy is preserved as long as its certificates are managed properly (e.g., a given certificate is not reused too often). Besides enabling the efficient generation of pseudonym certificates, SCMS also enables their revocation and linkage in case of misbehavior, thus facilitating investigations by law enforcement authorities whenever necessary. This revocation process is such that, with a single piece of information placed on a Certificate Revocation List (CRL), multiple certificates from a revoked vehicle can be identified as invalid.
One of the main advantages of SCMS's revocation procedure is that CRLs' size grows with the number of revoked vehicles, not with the number of certificates revoked. This is an important feature in the context of V2X due to the large number of pseudonym certificates carried by each vehicle. However, this benefit also comes with a drawback: a CRL entry's lifespan corresponds to the duration of the batch of pseudonym certificates carried by the revoked vehicle, meaning that those entries are not as short-lived as the certificates themselves. Since the batches are expected to cover 1-3 years [34] , but this coverage may reach as much as 30 years [18] , this is likely to lead to large CRLs, As a result, the bandwidth usage for the distribution of CRLs can become a burden if many vehicles are revoked. In addition, since SCMS's design is such that the cost of checking a certificate's revocation status is proportional to the number of entries in the CRL, the latter's growth also impacts the processing overhead at the vehicles.
Aiming to tackle this CRL expansion issue, in this article we improve SCMS's revocation process with the adoption of activation codes: small pieces of information without which pseudonym certificates previously issued become useless. Hence, by preventing revoked vehicles from obtaining those codes, the entries associated to those certificates can be safely removed from CRLs. The proposed design, named Activation Codes for Pseudonym Certificates (ACPC), builds upon previous works such as Issue First Activate Later (IFAL) [33] and Binary Hash Tree based Certificate Access Management (BCAM) [18] . Nevertheless, it addresses security and performance issues in both solutions, leading to a more robust key revocation process for V2X communications.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the SCMS architecture in further detail. Section 3 reviews related works aimed specifically at reducing CRL sizes in V2X communications. We then present the proposed ACPC solution is Section 4. Section 5 analyzes the security of ACPC's certificate issuance and revocation procedures. Section 6 compares our solution with related works, in terms of security and efficiency, from a theoretical and experimental perspective. Finally, Section 7 concludes the discussion.
General Notation
For convenience of the reader, Table 1 lists the main symbols and notation that appear along this document. Whenever pertinent, we assume standard algorithms for data encryption hashing and digital signatures. In particular, we assume that the following algorithms are employed: symmetric encryption (i.e., using shared keys) is done with the AES block cipher [23] whereas asymmetric encryption (i.e., involving public/private key pairs) is performed with ECIES [14] ; hashing is performed with SHA-2 [25] or SHA-3 [26] ; and the creation and verification of digital signatures uses algorithms such as ECDSA [24] or EdDSA [3, 16] . Signature of bitstring str, using key K Verif (K, str)
Verification of signature on str, using key K |str|
The length of bitstring str, in bits. str1 str2
Concatenation of bitstrings str1 and str2
The Security Credential Management System (SCMS)
The Security Credential Management System (SCMS) [34, 5] provides efficient mechanisms for the provisioning and revocation of pseudonym certificates in V2X communications. Combined, these mechanisms enable revocable privacy while ensuring that no single entity in the system can track honest vehicles. As a result, it addresses the needs of the "honest-but-curious" security model [17] , in which the system's entities are expected to follow the correct protocols, but may engage in passive attacks such as trying to infer sensitive information from the exchanged data (e.g., aiming to track vehicles). Actually, it also takes into account attacks in a security model slightly more powerful than the "honest-but-curious" approach, which we call "dishonest-if-allowed": the system's entities may engage in active attacks, subverting the protocols' execution, but only if (1) this would bring them some advantage (e.g., the ability to track vehicles) and (2) if such misbehavior can go undetected. After SMCS was published and became one of the leading candidate designs for protecting V2X security in the US [34, 5] , different improvements to its design have been proposed [18, 32, 31] . Since the proposal hereby presented builds upon SCMS and can also take advantage of the aforementioned improvements, in what follows we describe SCMS in some detail, giving an overview of the state of the art and of the limitations targeted by our solution.
Overview
In SCMS, each vehicle receives two types of certificates: one enrollment certificate, which identifies authorized devices and is expected to have a long lifespan (e.g., years) before expiring; and multiple pseudonym certificates, each having a short validity (e.g., a few days), so σ 1 certificates of this type are valid simultaneously. For protecting their privacy, vehicles may alternate the pseudonym certificates employed when sending different messages, thus avoiding tracking by nearby vehicles or by roadside units. In practice, however, it is important that σ remains small to limit the effects of "sybil-like" attacks [8] , in which one vehicle poses as a platoon by sending multiple messages signed with different pseudonym certificates. Otherwise, a vehicle abusing its pseudonymity in this manner could, for example, receive preferential treatment from traffic lights programmed to give higher priority to congested roads [22] .
As previously mentioned, SCMS was designed to allow the distribution of multiple pseudonym certificates to vehicles in an efficient manner, while providing mechanisms for easily revoking them if their owners misbehave. For this purpose, SCMS relies basically on the following entities (see Figure 1 for a complete architecture and [34] for the description of all of its elements):
• Pseudonym Certificate Authority (PCA): responsible for issuing pseudonym certificates to devices.
• Registration Authority (RA): receives and validates requests for batches of pseudonym certificates from devices, identified by their enrollment certificates. Those requests are individually forwarded to the PCA, in such a manner that requests associated to different devices are shuffled together so the PCA cannot link a set of requests to a same device.
• Linkage Authority (LA): generate random-like bitstrings that are added to certificates so they can be efficiently revoked (namely, multiple certificates belonging to a same device can be linked together by adding a small amount of information to certificate revocation lists -CRLs). SCMS uses two LAs, even though its architecture supports additional LAs.
• Misbehavior Authority (MA): identify misbehavior by devices and, whenever necessary, revokes them by placing their certificate identifiers into a CRL.
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Policy These entities play different roles in the two main procedures provided by SCMS: the butterfly key expansion, which allows pseudonym certificates to be issued; and key linkage, which allows the efficient revocation of malicious vehicles. Both are described in the following subsections.
The butterfly key expansion
The butterfly key expansion enables vehicles to obtain arbitrarily large sets of (short-lived) pseudonym certificates by means of a single, small-sized request message from vehicles. Figure 2 illustrates this process, whereas Table 2 lists the corresponding operations, explained in what follows.
The vehicle starts by picking two random caterpillar private keys, s and e, from which the corresponding public caterpillar keys S = s · G and E = e · G are computed. It also picks two random seeds for initializing pseudorandom functions f 1 and f 2 . The quadruple (S, f 1 , E, f 2 ) is then sent to the Registration Authority (RA).
The RA then generates β public cocoon signature keysŜ i = S + f 1 (i) · G, where 0 i < β. Analogously, the RA uses E for generating β public cocoon encryption keyŝ
Pairs of public cocoon keys (Ŝ i ,Ê i ) from different vehicles are then shuffled together, and sent individually to the Pseudonym Certificate Authority (PCA) for the generation of the corresponding pseudonym certificates.
The subsequent procedure followed by the PCA when processing (Ŝ i ,Ê i ) depends on whether explicit or implicit certificates [6] are employed. For explicit certificates, the PCA picks a random r i and computes the vehicle's public signature key as U i =Ŝ i + r i · G. The PCA then digitally signs this public key together with any required metadata meta 
Whichever the certification model adopted, the resulting certificate and its companion data (namely, r i for explicit certificates, and sig i for implicit ones) is encrypted withÊ i . To avoid Man-in-the-Middle attacks by the RA, this encrypted package is also signed with the PCA's own private key U . The PCA's response is then sent to the RA, which gathers and de-shuffles them before relaying the corresponding certificates to the requesting vehicle. Finally, the vehicle verifies the PCA's signature on the encrypted certificates, uses the Table 2 : The butterfly key expansion process for issuing pseudonym certificates.
private cocoon encryption keyê i = e + f 2 (i) to decrypt the PCA's response, and verifies the validity of the pseudonym certificate thereby enclosed. For explicit certificates, this verification consists in checking that the certificate's signature is valid and that the public key U i was indeed derived from s and r i , i.e. that U i = (s + f 1 (i) + r i ) · G; in that case, the vehicle's private key is set to u i = s + f 1 (i) + r i . When the certificates are implicit, the vehicle simply follows the regular implicit verification protocol described in [6] : it computes its own private key as u i = h i · (s + f 1 (i)) + sig i , sets the corresponding public key to U i = u i · G, and verifies that U i = h i · V i + U, where U is the PCA's public signature key.
Independently of the type of certificate adopted, the vehicles' privacy is protected in this process as long as there is no collusion between RA and PCAṠpecifically, the shuffling of public cocoon keys performed by the RA prevents the PCA from learning whether or not a group of keys received belong to a same device. Unlinkability of public keys towards the RA, in turn, is obtained because the latter does not learn the value of cert i in the PCA's encrypted response. To avoid large certificate revocation lists (CRLs), revocation in SCMS is done in such a manner that many certificates from a same user can be linked together by inserting only a small amount of information into a CRL. For this purpose, each pseudonym certificate generated by the PCA includes a linkage value lv, computed by XORing two pre-linkage values, plv 1 and plv 1 , provided by two different Linkage Authorities (LA). The generation of plv i by LA i is done upon request by the RA, as follows (see Figure 3) .
Key linkage
First, LA i picks a random, 128-bit linkage seed ls i (0). Next, if the RA's request covers τ certificate time periods, LA i iteratively computes a τ -long hash chain [19] ls i (t) = Hash(la_id i ls i (t − 1)), where la_id i is LA i 's identity string and 1 t < τ . Each ls i (t) is then used in the computation of σ pre-linkage values plv i (t, c) = Enc(ls i (t), la_id i c), for 0 c < σ. Finally, every plv i (t, c) is truncated to a suitable length, individually encrypted and authenticated using a key shared between the PCA and LA i , and then sent to the RA. The RA simply includes this encrypted information, together with the corresponding cocoon keys, in the requests sent to the PCA. As a result, the latter can compute the linkage value to be included in the the c-th certificate valid in time period t as lv(t, c) = plv 1 (t, c) ⊕ plv 2 (t, c).
Whenever the Misbehavior Authority (MA) identifies a malicious vehicle, its nonexpired certificates can be revoked altogether. This is accomplished via the collaboration among PCA, RA, and LAs. Namely, the PCA can associate the lv informed by the MA to the original pseudonym certificate request received from the RA. The PCA then provides this information, together with the corresponding pre-linkage values plv i (t, c), to the RA. The RA, in turn, can (1) identify the vehicle/driver behind that certificate request, placing the corresponding enrollment certificate in a blacklist for preventing its owner from obtaining new pseudonym certificates, and (2) ask LA i to identify the linkage seed ls i (0) from which plv i (t, c) was computed. Finally, each LA i provides RA with ls i (t s ), where t s is the time period from which the revocation starts being valid (e.g., the time period when the misbehavior first occurred, or the current one). The set of ls i (t s ) received from the LAs can then be placed in a CRL to be distributed throughout the system, allowing any entity to compute lv(t, c) for time periods t t s , linking the corresponding certificates to a single CRL entry. Consequently, the misbehaving vehicle's future certificates are revoked and can be linked together; past certificates remain protected, though, preserving the vehicle's privacy prior to the detection of the malicious activity.
In terms of computational costs, this revocation process is such that each revoked device contributes with 2 pre-linkage values to the CRL. Hence, the CRL grows linearly with the number of revoked vehicles, not with the number of revoked certificates. The main drawback of this gain in size is that checking whether a given certificate is in the CRL requires the verification of every CRL entry against that certificate's linkage value. More precisely, for each CRL entry published at time period t s , the verification of whether it covers a given certificate involves basically the computation of two components: a) ls i (t c ): it takes 2 · (t c − t s ) hashes to compute ls i (t c ) from ls i (t s ), where i = {1, 2}
and t c is the time period when the verification is performed. This cost may be reduced by means of pre-computation, i.e., if the vehicles always keeps the updated version of the linkage seeds, ls i (t c ), besides the original ones provided in the CRL. Nevertheless, to cope with the lack of a system-wide time synchronization [33] , vehicles may actually need to keep a slightly older linkage seed in memory; for example, by keeping ls i (t c − ) for a small , it is possible to compute ls i (t c ) with only hashes.
since the certificate under analysis may be any out of σ that are valid in the current time period, it takes up to σ encryptions to compute each plv i (t c , c) from ls i (t c ). With enough memory, the latency of this process can be reduced via the pre-computation of a look-up table with all possible σ entries for each ls i (t c ) in the CRL.
those entries: after all, linkage seeds placed into a CRL can only be safely removed from it after all certificates associated to those seeds have expired. Consequently, even if device revocation events occur at a low frequency, CRLs may actually grow big because the corresponding entries remain in the CRL for a duration comparable to that of certificate batches (e.g., years). Actually, this issue is present even in recently proposed improvements to SCMS's key-revocation process. For example, in [5] , the pre-linkage values are computed using a Davies-Meyer construction [28] aiming to avoid possible vulnerabilities related to the reversibility of encryption, a modification that does not affect the longevity of the CRLs' entries. As another example, in [31] the linkage and pre-linkage values are computed with suffix-free hashes, which improves the system's resilience against birthday attacks, and another layer in the hash tree is added to simplify the temporary linkage/revocation of vehicles. Even though entries for temporarily revoked vehicles can be swiftly removed from CRLs, this facility does not apply to entries related to permanent revocations.
One possible approach for reducing the size of CRLs is to rely on Bloom Filters [29, 11] . More precisely, this probabilistic data structure allows the CRL list to be compressed, although this comes at the cost of false-positives (but no false-negatives) on the pertinence test. Although potentially useful for reducing CRL sizes when many certificates need to be revoked, this approach is likely to be inefficient when applied to the revocation of only a few vehicles. The reason is that the filter's size depends on the maximum number of certificate revocations supported, so the CRL always maintains its full size despite the actual number of revoked certificates. Given the large number of pseudonym certificates per vehicle, Bloom filters are potentially more efficient than placing in the CRL every single certificate belonging to a revoked vehicle. However, such technique is not as appealing when combined with solutions such as SCMS, in which all certificates from a single vehicle can be revoked altogether with a single CRL entry. In this scenario, Bloom filters are useful mostly to store multiple certificate identifiers at the vehicles' side, as proposed in [12] , which makes this solution complementary to activation codes.
A more promising approach, which is also adopted in ACPC, is to prevent a revoked vehicle from accessing its pseudonym certificates. This is the basic idea behind the Issue First Activate Later (IFAL) scheme [33] . In IFAL, non-revoked vehicles can periodically query the system for the "activation codes", small pieces of information required to compute the private keys for their own certificates. As a result, the identifiers for revoked certificates that have been activated need to remain in the CRL only until their corresponding expiration dates, since subsequent certificates issue to the same vehicle cannot be activated. Albeit interesting, IFAL suffers from a significant security issue: since the PCA communicates directly with the vehicles, it can link the pseudonym certificates it issues to the corresponding vehicle's enrollment certificates, even without colluding with any other entity. The only protection offered by IFAL against such linkability risk is that it requires the PCA to delete the information produced during the certificate issuance process [33, Sec. 3.2] ; however, such requirement can be easily ignored by a dishonest PCA. Unfortunately, this makes the IFAL less secure than SCMS itself, hindering an eventual integration between the two solutions.
The Binary Hash Tree based Certificate Access Management (BCAM) scheme [18] is another scheme that uses activation codes for reducing CRL sizes. Unlike IFAL, however, BCAM was designed to interoperate with the SCMS architecture, inheriting its ability to protect the privacy of honest users against a dishonest PCA as long as it does not collude with other system entities. More precisely, in BCAM the RA does not simply relay the PCA-encrypted certificate batches to the requesting vehicle, but first sends them to a Certificate Access Manager (CAM), which encrypts those batches using a symmetric cipher. The CAM-encrypted batches can only be decrypted by vehicles that are able to compute corresponding activation codes, called device specific values (DSVs). Instead of requiring vehicles to explicitly request their DSVs, though, the CAM builds a binary hash tree whose leaves allow the DSVs to be computed, and then broadcasts the nodes of the tree that allow non-revoked vehicles (and only them) to recover their own DSVs. As a result, the distribution of activation codes in BCAM is considerably more efficient that the one in IFAL. Nevertheless, and even though BCAM does improve SCMS's revocation process, it can be further improved in terms of security and efficiency. Namely, one security drawback of BCAM's design is that it creates an extra point of collusion in the SCMS architecture: the CAM, like the RA, learns which batch of PCA-encrypted certificates belong to a same vehicle; consequently, the CAM can collude with the PCA to violate those certificates' unlinkability and, hence, the users' privacy. In addition, during the butterfly key expansion, the CAM encrypts certificates that have already been encrypted by the PCA; therefore, this process can be further optimized if those two encryption processes are combined into one. Both issues are addressed in the proposed ACPC solution. ... (2) lsi ( To avoid the growth of CRLs while preserving the performance gains associated with the butterfly key derivation, we build upon the concept of activation codes: bitstrings without which certificates previously acquired cannot be used (namely, in the proposed solution, they cannot be decrypted). Each activation code enables the usage of certificates corresponding to a certain activation period, which spans α 1 certificate time periods. This is illustrated in Figure 4 , for activation periods covering α = 3 time periods.
Those codes are then periodically disclosed to non-revoked vehicles before the start of the corresponding time periods to allow a timely activation of their own certificates. Revoked vehicles are prevented from obtaining activation codes for their certificates, at least until this revocation status is removed. As a result, identifiers of revoked certificates that cannot be activated do not need to remain in CRLs, reducing the sizes of the latter. For example, certificates could be valid for 1 week, whereas the activation period could be set to 3 weeks and be disclosed 1 week before they are actually required. In this case, identifiers for certificates from revoked vehicles would have to remain in CRLs for at most 4 weeks: if the codes for the next activation period have not yet been disclosed, then the CRL needs to cover only the current activation period (at most 3 weeks); otherwise, the CRL needs to cover the next activation period (3 weeks) and the remainder of the current one (at most 1 week). After that, revoked devices do not receive new activation codes.
The proposed solution, named ACPC (Activation Codes for Pseudonym Certificates), is inspired by works such as IFAL [33] and BCAM [18] . However, it innovates by addressing the main shortcomings of these solutions in terms of performance and security, as further discussed in Section 6.
Generating activation codes: binary hash trees
Similarly to BCAM, we assume the existence of one or more Certificate Access Managers (CAM), each having a different identifier cam_id. CAMs are entities responsible for creating and distributing activation codes. For this purpose, a CAM creates a binary hash tree tree t for each time period t, using a pre-image resistant hash function, as illustrated in Figure 5 . If the activation period spans n + 1 time periods, then tree t = . . . = tree t+n . 
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Figure 5: Activation tree generated by CAM. The activation codes correspond to the leaves of the binary hash tree.
The tree's nodes are denoted node t (depth, count), where depth 0 and 0 count 2 depth −1 indicate the node's position inside the tree. The height of the tree must match the length of the vehicles' identifiers (VID), in bits. As a result, each leaf node t (depth, count) can be used to represent a single vehicle in the system: the one with VID = count. In [18] , for example, the suggested length of VID is 40 bits, which is enough to cover more than 1 trillion vehicles. For brevity of notation, we denote by code t,VID the leaf of tree t whose index corresponds to a given VID, i.e., code t,VID = node t (|VID|, VID). The nodes of tree t are assumed to be k-bit long, yielding a k-bit security level (e.g., in modern deployments one would expect k = 128). The tree is built in the following manner. First, its root node t (0, 0) is set to a (pseudo)random bitstring, unique for each activation period. Every other node is then computed from its parent node combined with a "security string" I, i.e., a different suffix for each node. More precisely, we have:
where the security string I is defined as
I = (cam_id t depth count)
If the activation period spans multiple time periods, then t is set to the first time period covered by that activation period. This approach gives the system enough flexibility to increase or reduce the length of the activation periods without incurring the repetition of security strings. As further discussed in A, such non-repeatable security strings are useful to thwart birthday attacks analogous to those described in [4, 31] . Table 3 shows suggested lengths for the fields that compose those security strings in ACPC, leading to |I| = 104. This composition is designed to support 40-bit long VIDs for 2 24 time periods, which means more than 300.000 years if the time periods are 1 week long. At the same time, it is unlikely to have any perceptible impact on the computation of activation trees, as long as the hash function's input fits its block size. For example, SHA-256 operates on 512-bit blocks, appending at least 65 bits to its input message (a bit '1' for padding, and a 64-bit length indicator) [25] ; therefore, a single call to its underlying compression function is enough to process a 128-bit node value value even when it is combined with a 319-bit or smaller security string. Figure 6 illustrates ACPC's pseudonym certificate issuance, in which the binary hash tree generated by the CAM is integrated into SCMS's butterfly key expansion process. As shown in this figure, when a vehicle with a given VID requests a batch of pseudonym certificates, it still provides the quadruple (S, f 1 , E, f 2 ) to the RA as described in Section 2.2. This should then lead to the generation of β = τ · σ certificates, so a total of σ certificates are valid for each of the τ time periods covered in the batch. Upon reception of the vehicle's request, the RA queries the CAM for the blinded activation codes A t = f a (code t,VID , t, VID)·G. This operation uses a pseudorandom function f a that is public, i.e., whose seed does not need to be kept secret. Nevertheless, its output at this point is unpredictable: after all, it involves the activation tree's leaf code t,VID , which has not yet been disclosed by the CAM. In addition, f a 's output is blinded by the CAM via the multiplication by the elliptic curve generator G, so the actual activation codes cannot be learned by the RA from the CAM's response.
Issuing pseudonym certificates with activation codes
The RA then proceeds with the butterfly key expansion process in a manner that is very similar to the process described in Section 2.2, except for one important difference: the blinded codes provided by the CAM are added to the computation of the public cocoon encryption keys. More precisely, letÊ t,c denote the c-th public cocoon encryption key that belongs to time period t. Each of those keys is then computed by the RA aŝ E t,c = E + A t + f 2 (t·σ + c) · G, where 0 c < σ and 0 t < τ . As usual, the resulting cocoon keys are shuffled together with keys from other vehicles, before being sent to the PCA. By using f 2 in the computation of cocoon encryption keys, the RA ensures that they cannot be later correlated by the CAM or by the PCA, even for groups of keys computed using the same A t . Therefore, this process preserves the unlinkability of pseudonym certificate requests, whether or not there is a collusion between CAM and PCA. Finally, the PCA computes the vehicle's (implicit or explicit) pseudonym certificate, which is encrypted withÊ t,c before being sent back to the RA. The RA, in turn, simply relays those certificates to the corresponding vehicle, without contacting the CAM once again. Since this procedure is identical to the one proposed in SCMS, the processing costs and bandwidth usage at the PCA remain unchanged. In addition, the underlying security properties discussed in Section 2.2 still apply, including the protection against MitM attacks performed by the RA and the unlinkability among certificates unless PCA and RA collude.
The result of this process is that the encrypted certificates obtained by the vehicle can only be decrypted if the associated code t,VID is also obtained. After all, the decryption key corresponding toÊ t,c is now computed asê t,c = e + f a (code t,VID , VID, t) + f 2 (t·σ + c). Therefore, to keep a vehicle with identifier V ID r from activating its own certificates, it suffices to prevent it from obtaining code t,V IDr . In that case, entries for that vehicles' certificates do not need to remain in CRLs for too long.
As a final remark, we note that the activation codes as hereby described can also combined with the optimized, unified butterfly key expansion process proposed in [32] . More precisely, this alternate design achieves better performance by replacing the pair of caterpillar keys (S, E) with a a single key X = x · G. Therefore, since the corresponding public cocoon keys X are employed by PCA for encrypting its response, the RA simply needs to include the blinded activation codes in their computation by making X t,c = X + A t + f 1 (t·σ + c) · G.
Distributing activation codes for non-revoked devices
In ACPC, like in BCAM, activation codes can be broadcast by the CAM to all non-revoked vehicles rather than individually sent to them upon request. This eliminates the need for bidirectional connectivity between vehicles and CAMs when distributing activation codes.
The tree's nodes that must be broadcast depend on which nodes are currently re-voked/suspended, taking into account that every node of a binary hash tree can be computed from its parent. For example, given the root of the tree, all of its leaves can be computed and, thus, all vehicles can obtain their corresponding activation codes. Hence, if no vehicle is revoked in time period t, the CAM only needs to broadcast node t (0, 0) to allow all certificates in the system to be activated. This leads to optimal performance when distributing activation codes.
When a vehicle needs to be revoked, however, the CAM must not reveal any of the nodes in the path between the corresponding leaf and the tree's root. This prevents the computation of that leaf not only by the revoked vehicle, but also by non-revoked vehicle that might try to collude with revoked ones to allow the activation of the latter's certificates. For example, consider the tree shown in Figure 5 . To revoke the vehicle whose VID is 4, the CAM would have to broadcast only the following nodes (shown with ticker borders in that figure): node(1, 0), which enables the computation of leaves node(3, 0) through node (3, 3) ; node(2, 3), used to compute leaves node(3, 6) and node (3, 7) ; and the leaf node (3, 5) . More generally, and as mentioned in [18] , when n r users out of n t are revoked, the number of nodes included in the message broadcast by the CAM is on average n r · lg(n t /n r ) for 1 n r n t /2 (cf. Theorem 1 of [1] ). Hence, albeit more expensive than the scenario in which no revocation occurs, this approach scales quite well, and is still more efficient than the individual delivery of each activation code. Actually, there are also efficient methods for encoding binary hash trees such as those hereby described, so the index of each node included in the broadcast message can be represented with less than |VID| bits (cf. Section 4.4 of [18] ), saving some bandwidth.
Security analysis
In this section, we discuss the security of ACPC's certificate issuance and revocation procedures.
Security of the certificate issuance process
In ACPC, a collusion between CAM and PCA (resp. RA) reveals as much information as the PCA (resp. RA) had available in the original SCMS. Indeed, if we remove the influence of A t over the public cocoon keys computed as described in Section 4.2, the result matches the public cocoon keys in SCMS. Therefore, a collusion with the CAM can only remove the entropy introduced by this entity, while still preserving the security properties discussed in Section 2.2.
In particular, a vehicle's private caterpillar key x remains protected by the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) during the whole execution of the protocol. Hence, RA, PCA and CAM are unable to recover the signature or decryption private keys derived from it, even if they collude. Unlinkability among certificates is similarly preserved, as long as the RA and PCA do not collude: the shuffling done by the RA still hides from the PCA any relationship between certificate requests intended for a same vehicle; meanwhile, the PCA's encrypted response prevents anyone but the appropriate vehicle from learning cert i . Finally, since the butterfly key expansion process grants vehicles the ability to verify whether or not the received certificates were generated in a fair manner, MitM attacks (e.g., by the RA) are averted.
It is worth mentioning that the aforementioned CAM's inability to create a new threat via collusion with other entities is not just a fortunate coincidence. Actually, the (unblinded) activation codes code t,VID are the only information initially kept secret by the CAM and, thus, that could be contributed in such collusion. Since those codes are periodically disclosed to allow vehicles to activate their certificates, though, by design such public disclosure should not negatively impact the system's security. Consequently, a "private disclosure" during a collusion is expected to have an equivalent result.
Security of the revocation procedure
The security of ACPC's revocation procedure relies on the first pre-image resistance of the hash function employed for the construction of activation trees, as well as the proper disclosure of its nodes by the CAM. In principle, following a dishonest-if-allowed model, this means that the choice of a secure hash function is enough to enforce revocation. At least this should be the case if we assume that the system's entities would gain nothing by illegitimately un-revoking vehicles, i.e., without authorization from the MA. Nonetheless, it is useful to evaluate what happens when one of the system's entities is compromised and, as a result, its capabilities are misused aiming to allow the activation of revoked devices.
On the one hand, a rogue/compromised CAM could disclose the roots of every activation tree to all vehicles, even revoked ones, allowing all certificates in the system to be activated. This would not give the attacker any advantage, though, besides disrupting the system's ability to revoke devices in an efficient manner. In particular, in consonance with the discussion in Section 5.1, this would not grant the CAM or any other entity the ability to track devices. Consequently, in a dishonest-if-allowed scenario, it is unlikely that the CAM itself would go rogue and engage in such malicious activity. Furthermore, if the CAM's storage is somehow compromised, the leakage of codes can still be contained by keeping the revoked vehicles' data in CRLs, just like in the original SCMS. Hence, the attack would not result in any catastrophic security breach, but only nullify the performance gains provided by activation codes.
On the other hand, a security breach at the RA or PCA should not reveal any information about activation codes. The reason is that these entities never learn those codes, which are only known by the CAM. Nevertheless, if any of these entities goes rogue or is compromised at a level that allows its behavior to be controlled by attackers, it can provide valid certificates to revoked vehicles independently of activation codes. Specifically, a dishonest PCA can always issue new pseudonym certificates for vehicles, including revoked ones, at least until the PCA itself is revoked. A compromised RA could act similarly, e.g., by requesting pseudonym certificates for a non-revoked V ID d , and then delivering those certificates to a revoked vehicle whose identifier is V ID r = V ID d . Such misbehavior is likely to go unnoticed because the certificates do not carry any VID on them. In addition, if V ID d corresponds to a valid vehicle whose pseudonym certificates have not been requested yet, the CAM would not be able to notice the fraud by the RA: from the CAM's perspective, this is simply a new vehicle in the system. Actually, even if V ID d has already been requested in the past, it would be difficult for the CAM to use this knowledge to prevent such attack. The reason is that, if the CAM is configured to refuse a second request for the same V ID d , management issues are likely to arise. For example, the processing of the initial request for V ID d may naturally fail, so an honest RA would actually need to send a second request referring to the same V ID d . As another example, a dishonest RA might abuse this process by performing a "denial-of-certification" attack: the RA queries the CAM requesting the caterpillar keys for a non-revoked V ID d , but it does not execute the pseudonym certificate issuance process; future requests referring to V ID d , potentially by honest RAs, would then fail.
These observations indicate that, even if a rogue RA or PCA never gains access to activation codes, their roles in the system still enable them to provide valid certificates for revoked vehicles. Actually, a similar discussion also applies to the original BCAM protocol, in which a rogue RA or PCA could provision revoked vehicles with the PCA-encrypted certificates, before they are once again encrypted by the CAM. Even though ACPC's approach of ensuring that only the CAM is able to distribute activation codes does not actually prevent such threats, it was adopted because it does reduce the system's attack surface. For example, suppose that RA and/or PCA store the (PCA-encrypted) certificates generated for the purposes of disaster recovery, as proposed in [18, Section 5.3.3] . In this case, a data breach disclosing the certificates issued for a vehicle that is now revoked does not create any security concern, since that vehicle remains unable to decrypt those certificates.
Comparison with related works: IFAL and BCAM
When compared to IFAL, ACPC differs in at least two important aspects. First, IFAL allows an "honest but curious" PCA to link several certificates to a same device; this privacy issue is absent in the solution hereby described if we assume, like in the original SCMS, that PCA and RA do not collude. Second, ACPC allows vehicles to obtain activation much more efficiently than IFAL's strategy, using binary hash trees to broadcast activation codes rather than requiring vehicles to individually request them.
Architecturally, ACPC shares more similarities with BCAM than with IFAL, in particular because both BCAM and our proposal use binary hash trees for the distribution of activation codes. However, ACPC provides better security, for at least two reasons. First and foremost, the fact that the CAM does not receive certificates from the RA prevents the former from learning which PCA-encrypted certificates belong to a same device; therefore, and unlike BCAM, a collusion between CAM and PCA does not allow those entities to track vehicles. Second, as discussed at the end of Section 5.2, ACPC also reduces the revocation procedure's attack surface by a rogue RA or PCA, so it is able to protect the vehicle's privacy even if PCA and CAM collude or are compromised.
As another relevant benefit, ACPC is more efficient than BCAM in terms of processing and bandwidth usage, as discussed in the following subsections.
Bandwidth usage
By integrating security strings into the activation trees, the nodes of those trees can be 128-bit long while still preserving a 128-bit security level, despite the number of revoked devices. When compared to BCAM, which uses 256-bit nodes for achieving the same security level (see A), this represents a 50% bandwidth gain for the distribution of activation trees.
In addition, ACPC also saves bandwidth between RA and CAM during the pseudonym certificate issuance process, because these entities only exchange data that represent nodes from activation trees, rather than batches of certificates. More precisely, assume that SCMS adopts implicit certificates, which are usually shorter that explicit ones, and employs the optimizations described in [32] , which removes the need of signing the encrypted package pkg. In that case, each PCA-encrypted response pkg = Enc(Ê i , {cert i , sig i }) is expected to be such that |pkg| 6k bits for a security level of k: (1) 2k bits for the implicit credential V i enclosed in cert i , since it corresponds to an elliptic curve point; (2) 2k bits for the random elliptic curve point that is generated during any ECIES-based encryption; (3) 2k bits for the signature sig i ; and (4) some extra bits for the certificate's metadata (e.g., a linkage value and an expiration date), as well as for the authentication tag resulting from the ECIES-based encryption, which we ignore in our calculations. Hence, for a batch size β = τ · σ, in BCAM the total bandwidth usage at the RA and CAM would be 2 · (6k) · (τ · σ) bits, where the "2" multiplication factor is due to the fact that this cost is paid both downstream and upstream: the RA sends PCA-encrypted batches to the CAM, and then receives CAM-encrypted batches.
In comparison, in ACPC the CAM simply sends τ /α blinded activation codes to the RA, where α 1 is the number of time periods covered by each activation period. Since each blinded activation code A is an elliptic curve point (i.e., 2k bits), this corresponds to an upstream (resp. downstream) cost at the CAM (resp. RA) of 2k · τ /α bits. Therefore, ACPC is expected to use approximately 1/(6σ · α) of the bandwidth required by BCAM during the pseudonym certificate issuance process. To give a numeric example, suppose that the system is configured in such a manner that 20 certificates are valid per time period (as in [18] ), and each activation period covers 4 time periods (e.g., for certificates valid for a week, the activation period would correspond to a month). In this case, issuing batches of certificates with ACPC would take 1/480 of the bandwidth required by BCAM.
Processing costs
Another improvement of ACPC over BCAM is that, in the latter, the CAM is responsible for encrypting the batches received from the RA, after they are delivered by the PCA. Consequently, the CAM ends up encrypting certificates that have already been encrypted by the PCA: the latter process is intended to preserve the vehicles' privacy, and the former is executed for the purpose of preventing their activation in case of revocation. The proposed approach integrates both purposes into a single encryption process, performed by the PCA, which was already present in SCMS itself.
In terms of processing at the CAM, BCAM is such that the number of encryptions performed grows proportionally to the size of the batches, which depends on the size of pkg and on the number of certificates per time period (σ). In comparison, ACPC's design is such that each activation period requires one PRF execution combined with an elliptic curve scalar multiplication, for computing the corresponding blinded activation codes A t = f a (code t,VID , t, VID)·G. Therefore, many symmetric encryption operations can be replaced by a single computation of a blinded activation code. Since scalar multiplications over elliptic curves are known to be considerably more expensive than symmetric encryption, however, the actual benefits of ACPC depends on the system parameters. More precisely, for a given value of |pkg|, the larger the number of time periods covered by each activation period (α), the larger the number of encryptions replaced by the computation of a blinded activation code and, hence, the better the processing times of ACPC when compared to BCAM.
To give some concrete numbers, we have implemented our proposal using the RELIC cryptography library version 0.4.1 [2] running on an Intel i5 4570 processor. In this setting, the computation of one blinded activation code takes 242,822 cycles. This is approximately 300 times the cost of one single AES encryption, which takes only 832 cycles. Based on these numbers, Figure 7 shows the total processing costs at the CAM when we assume pseudonym certificate batches that span a period of 3-years, which corresponds to 156 one-week long time periods. The smallest number of encryption for BCAM, 12480, refers to a scenario where σ = 20 and |pkg| = 512 bits, meaning that 156 * 20 = 3120 pseudonym certificates are encrypted by the CAM and each encryption takes 512/128 = 4 calls to a 128-bit block cipher such as AES. The largest number of encryptions, 199680, is obtained when σ = 40 and |pkg| = 4096 bits, so the encryption of each of the 156 * 20 = 6240 certificates requires 4096/128 = 32 calls to the underlying 128-bit block cipher. As observed in this figure, the performance of ACPC is comparable to BCAM's, and usually surpasses it, in particular for larger numbers of α. For instance, when each activation period spans 4 certificate time periods, only 156/4 = 39 blinded activation codes are computed, so the corresponding ACPC-4 curve always remains below BCAM's curve.
Even more importantly, the fact that the CAM does not re-encrypt batches in ACPC means that the vehicles do not need to remove this additional encryption layer when processing the received pseudonym certificates. Instead, the only decryption operation performed at the vehicle's side is the one originally present in SCMS itself, which reverses the encryption done by the PCA. Therefore, the total overhead incurred by ACPC refers to the computation of one (unblinded) activation code f a (code t,VID , t, VID) per activation period, so it can be included in the computation of the decryption keyê t,c . When compared to BCAM, this means that |pkg|/128 encryptions are replaced by τ /α invocations of a PRF at the vehicle's side. Even if we consider the scenario from Figure 7 in which the benefits of ACPC are less pronounced at the CAM's side (namely, α = 1 and |pkg| = 512), this still means that ACPC trades 12480 decryptions for 156 PRF executions. In practice, assuming that one PRF execution takes roughly as much processing as one decryption, this means that the overhead added by ACPC's activation codes is approximately 1/80 of the overhead incurred by BCAM at the vehicles' side. Finally, the usage of activation codes is transparent from the PCA's perspective, so its processing costs remain unchanged. For the RA, in turn, a single elliptic curve addition per activation period is necessary, to compute E + A t , from which the corresponding public cocoon keysÊ t,c can be obtained. Therefore, the overhead incurred by ACPC at the RA is expected to be negligible.
Conclusions
Security and privacy mechanisms are essential for preventing drivers from abusing V2X communications to gain unwarranted advantages over their peers, and also for limiting any entity's ability to track honest vehicles. A promising solution to address such requirements is the Security Credential Management System (SCMS), which provides efficient and privacy-preserving mechanisms for issuing pseudonym certificates to vehicles and revoking them in case of misbehavior. As a drawback, however, SCMS's revocation procedure is such that, after certificate identifiers are included in a CRL, it may take a long time for the corresponding CRL entries to be removed. This incurs not only in bandwidth overheads for the CRL distribution, but also increases the processing cost at vehicles for verifying a certificate's revocation status.
Aiming to address these issues, in this article we present improvements on SCMS's pseudonym certificate revocation process. The proposed design, named Activation Codes for Pseudonym Certificates (ACPC), is based on activation codes, small pieces of information without which pseudonym certificates previously issued become useless. Consequently, by ensuring that only non-revoked vehicles are periodically provided with those codes, entries associated with revoked vehicle's certificates can be safely removed from CRLs.
Even though ACPC builds upon ideas originally discussed in recent works, in particular IFAL [33] and BCAM [18] , it leads to a significantly more security and efficient pseudonym certificate system. More precisely, SCMS's design is such that a dishonest PCA would have to collude with the RA to be able to track vehicles, and ACPC does not increase this vulnerability surface. In contrast, in IFAL a dishonest PCA could track vehicles without colluding with any other entities, whereas in BCAM a collusion between CAM and PCA would enable them to similarly violate the drivers' privacy, In terms of performance, one advantage of ACPC over IFAL refers to the distribution of activation codes: the CAM can broadcast codes to all non-revoked vehicles, so no bidirectional connectivity is required between vehicles and CAM. Even though such distribution process is as efficient as BCAM's, ACPC leads to a much more efficient certificate issuance process than BCAM: since the proposed design avoids the re-encryption of pseudonym certificates by the CAM, the CAM-RA bandwidth usage in ACPC is expected to be lower than 1/480 of BCAM's, and the processing overhead added by ACPCś activation codes at the vehicle's side is expected to be 1/80 or less than what is observed with BCAM.strategy comes from the observation that collisions between link j and node t (depth, count) are useless if they are computed with different suffixes. After all, in that case link j−1 will not match the parent of node t (depth, count), i.e., it will necessarily be a second pre-image rather than the actual pre-image of that node. At the same time, attackers are unable to gather more than 1 value of node t (depth, count) for any given suffix. Consequently, to obtain a high probability of collisions for that suffix, the attacker would have to build a table with 2 n = 2 k−m = 2 k entries. In other words, the approach adopted in ACPC leads to a 128-bit security level even when the nodes themselves are 128-bit long.
